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EXPERT REVIEW
What causes aberrant salience in schizophrenia? A role for
impaired short-term habituation and the GRIA1 (GluA1)
AMPA receptor subunit
C Barkus1, DJ Sanderson2, JNP Rawlins3, ME Walton3, PJ Harrison1 and DM Bannerman3
The GRIA1 locus, encoding the GluA1 (also known as GluRA or GluR1) AMPA glutamate receptor subunit, shows genome-wide
association to schizophrenia. As well as extending the evidence that glutamatergic abnormalities have a key role in the disorder,
this ﬁnding draws attention to the behavioural phenotype of Gria1 knockout mice. These mice show deﬁcits in short-term
habituation. Importantly, under some conditions the attention being paid to a recently presented neutral stimulus can actually
increase rather than decrease (sensitization). We propose that this mouse phenotype represents a cause of aberrant salience and, in
turn, that aberrant salience (and the resulting positive symptoms) in schizophrenia may arise, at least in part, from a glutamatergic
genetic predisposition and a deﬁcit in short-term habituation. This proposal links an established risk gene with a psychological
process central to psychosis and is supported by ﬁndings of comparable deﬁcits in short-term habituation in mice lacking the
NMDAR receptor subunit Grin2a (which also shows association to schizophrenia). As aberrant salience is primarily a dopaminergic
phenomenon, the model supports the view that the dopaminergic abnormalities can be downstream of a glutamatergic aetiology.
Finally, we suggest that, as illustrated here, the real value of genetically modiﬁed mice is not as ‘models of schizophrenia’ but as
experimental tools that can link genomic discoveries with psychological processes and help elucidate the underlying neural
mechanisms.
Molecular Psychiatry (2014) 19, 1060–1070; doi:10.1038/mp.2014.91; published online 16 September 2014
There is now strong evidence that hyper-dopaminergic activity
underlies the positive psychotic symptoms of schizophrenia.1–3
Dopaminergic abnormalities have a similarly proximate role in
aberrant salience,4,5 which Kapur and others have theorized is
central to the genesis and understanding of positive psychotic
symptoms.6–9 However, the cause of this dopamine dysregulation
is unspeciﬁed in Kapur’s model and has not yet been resolved.8,10
Indeed, while considerable effort has gone into investigating and
describing the putative links between dopamine, aberrant salience
and psychosis, comparatively little effort has been expended in
identifying the possible causes of aberrant salience.
Howes and Kapur8 noted that although the dysregulated,
hyperdopaminergic state could be the result of a primary abnor-
mality in the mesolimbic dopamine system, it could also be a
secondary consequence of some other brain disturbance (or
disturbances) and thus represent a ‘ﬁnal common pathway’ in
schizophrenia. The glutamate system is a prime candidate for this
upstream abnormality6,11–15 with diverse evidence for glutamatergic
dysfunction, particularly NMDAR signalling, in the pathophysiol-
ogy of schizophrenia,16,17 including data from postmortem,18,19
neuroimaging,20,21 and immunological22 studies of the disorder, as
well as indirectly from pharmacological ﬁndings17 and animal
models.23 An aetiological role for glutamate is now also likely
based on recent genetic data. Initial evidence came from candi-
date gene association studies24,25 with observations that genes
involved in glutamate synapses and NMDAR-mediated signalling
are over-represented among schizophrenia genes.26–29 These
ﬁndings were subsequently supported by pathway analyses of
genome-wide association studies (GWAS) and by de novo copy
number variant data30,31 and exome sequencing.32
Extending these data, the Ripke et al.33 GWAS found that a locus
upstream of GRIA1 showed signiﬁcant association to schizophre-
nia.33 This association was conﬁrmed by the recent larger GWAS
study (P= 1.06 × 10−10), which also identiﬁed genome-wide
signiﬁcant association to other glutamate receptor loci, discussed
below.34 GRIA1 encodes the GluA1 (also known as GluRA or GluR1)
subunit of the AMPA subtype of glutamate receptor. This
association complements prior evidence that AMPARs, as well as
NMDARs, are involved in the disorder.18,35–40 Of particular
relevance here is evidence that there are reductions of GluA1
mRNA36,37 and GluA1,35 as well as AMPAR binding sites,39 in the
hippocampus in schizophrenia, and which do not appear to be
secondary to antipsychotic medication.41–44
In this review, we describe the behavioural phenotype of
Gria1− /− mice and, in particular, a deﬁcit whereby these mice fail
to reduce the amount of attention that is paid to recently
presented stimuli.45,46 This failure to habituate means that stimuli
continue to be surprising and grab attention for longer than
would be normal. In fact, under some circumstances, these mice
actually display sensitization, whereby more attention is paid to a
recently presented stimulus than to a non-recent stimulus.47 Thus
for these mice the stimulus is treated as even more salient or
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intense the second time it is presented. Deﬁcits in short-term
habituation therefore represent a potential driver of aberrant
salience. This provides a key, mechanistic component of our
present hypothesis that GluA1 dysfunction contributes to aberrant
salience in schizophrenia; we further suggest that this is mediated
via enhanced dopamine signalling. This proposal provides a
plausible causal link between a robust schizophrenia risk gene
locus and a psychological process of central importance in
psychosis. Moreover, it directly links the glutamate and dopamine
components of the disorder.
ABERRANT SALIENCE, DOPAMINE AND PSYCHOSIS
Psychosis has been viewed as a disorder of aberrant salience,7
mediated via a hyper-dopaminergic state.6,7,9,48,49 For our
purposes, salience can be deﬁned as the ability of a stimulus to
grab attention and to drive behaviour.5,7 Salience not only reﬂects
the innate properties of the stimulus (for example, brightness,
loudness) but can also reﬂect its potential motivational signiﬁ-
cance. Kapur7 suggested that, before experiencing psychosis,
patients will develop an exaggerated release of dopamine,
independent of, and out of synchrony with, the context. The
cause is not speciﬁed in Kapur’s model, but the resulting
hyperdopaminergic state will then lead to the persistent and
inappropriate assignment of salience to stimuli.
This state of aberrant salience can lead to inappropriate asso-
ciations being formed, potentially via abnormal prediction error
signals in the ventral striatum and other brain regions.50–54 For
example, Jensen et al.50 demonstrated aberrant learning and
ventral striatal activation in schizophrenia using an aversive,
Pavlovian discriminative fear conditioning paradigm. In this task,
subjects were exposed to different visual stimuli. One stimulus
(the conditioned stimulus; CS+) was paired with a loud noise (the
unconditioned stimulus), whereas the other visual stimulus was
not paired with the aversive event (CS− ). Jensen and colleagues
found inappropriately strong ventral striatal activation in response
to the control stimulus (CS− cue), accompanied by abnormal
learning, assessed both by self-report and galvanic skin responses
(see also Holt et al.55). Similarly, Murray et al.52 found that ﬁrst-
episode patients with active positive symptoms responded faster
to neutral stimuli than controls during a reward learning task
(response latencies were not signiﬁcantly different to rewarded
stimuli) and that these subjects exhibited abnormal BOLD
responses associated with reward prediction error in dopa-
minergic midbrain, striatum and limbic areas. Likewise, Roiser
et al.56 have reported aberrant reward learning in symptomatic
but not asymptomatic patients with schizophrenia, and in un-
medicated individuals at ultra-high risk of developing the
condition.57 This aberrant reward learning was correlated with
the severity of delusion-like symptoms, as were ventral striatal
BOLD responses to irrelevant stimuli.
Thus it has been widely argued that the psychotic symptoms
associated with schizophrenia, such as delusions and hallucina-
tions, are the result of this fundamental abnormality in learn-
ing7,54,58,59 and that their occurrence is correlated with aberrant
salience.56 Kapur hypothesized that patients would begin by
assigning signiﬁcance or importance to an incidental, neutral
stimulus and, over a period of time, build up a complex delusion
as a way of explaining why this unimportant object or detail has
taken on such great meaning. Delusions are therefore a ‘cognitive
effort by the patient to make sense of these aberrantly salient
experiences’7 and they reﬂect a maladaptive update of the
patient’s world view.53 Similarly, hallucinations may be experi-
ences that result from aberrant salience being applied to internally
generated stimuli.
Kapur’s ideas build on the incentive or motivational salience
hypothesis of dopamine’s actions put forward by Berridge
and Robinson,60 Robbins and Everitt61 and others.62–67 Kapur
suggested that the mesolimbic dopamine system underlies moti-
vational salience and so ‘mediates the conversion of the neural
representation of an external stimulus from a neutral, cold bit of
information into an attractive or aversive entity’ (that is, some-
thing that is of biological signiﬁcance).7 In addition, dopamine can
facilitate aspects of associative learning (for example, refs. 68–71).
Therefore, the ability of a stimulus to grab attention, drive action
and potentially form associations with other stimuli are all
inﬂuenced by dopamine.
DOPAMINE AND NOVELTY
The hypothesis that dopamine underlies the incentive or motiva-
tional salience of stimuli (and hence provides a signal of biological
signiﬁcance) captures a key element of what dopamine is doing,
but it may not be the whole story: dopamine release is also
associated with novelty. Although burst ﬁring of dopamine cells in
the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra pars
compacta (SNc) is increased by unexpected rewards, and reduced
if an expected reward is omitted, crucially dopamine neuronal
activity is also triggered by novel stimuli that are not yet, and may
never be, directly associated with reward or punishment and are
affectively neutral. Human functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) studies have demonstrated that activation of the VTA/SNc
can code for the absolute novelty of a stimulus and that this
haemodynamic signal exhibits repetition suppression with
repeated presentation of the stimulus.72 More directly, putative
dopamine neurons in the VTA/SNc have been found to exhibit an
increase in ﬁring to novel, neutral stimuli.73–75 Furthermore, recent
evidence using dopamine voltammetry directly shows increased
dopamine release in ventral striatum in response to novel, neutral
stimuli.69,76–78 The response to novelty may not be restricted to
just the mesolimbic VTA-ventral striatal pathway but may also
include activity in the SNc–dorsal striatal circuitry.72,79 Thus,
dopamine release in the striatum is associated not only with
incentive or motivational salience but also with novelty. As such,
dopamine may signal not only stimuli of biological signiﬁcance
but also stimuli of ‘potential’ biological signiﬁcance (as would be
the case for any novel stimulus). Indeed, it has been argued that
the coding of absolute novelty by dopamine may be treated like a
signal that motivates exploration for potential reinforcers.72,80
A key point is that when stimuli are novel they grab the focus of
attention and are perceived more intensely. Novel stimuli gene-
rate exploration,81 and they readily enter into associations with
other stimuli.82 Therefore, novelty is important, both in terms of
determining salience, as well as for the corresponding changes in
dopamine activity.5 Glutamate receptors, and in particular GluA1-
containing AMPARs, have a fundamental role in the response to
novel stimuli and in the short-term habituation to such stimuli as a
result of recent experience.45,46
Gria1 (GluA1) KNOCKOUT MICE: SELECTIVE IMPAIRMENTS IN
SHORT-TERM HABITUATION
The AMPAR is a hetero-oligomeric protein complex consisting
of combinations of four subunits (GluA1–4, or GluRA–D), each
encoded by a separate gene (GRIA1–4).83 Mice in which the gene
encoding GluA1 is knocked out constitutively exhibit normal
development, life expectancy and ﬁne structure of neuronal
dendrites and synapses (Gria1− /− mice84). However, there is a
reduction in the number of functional AMPA receptors, and both
somatic and synaptic glutamatergic currents are reduced.85–87 A
number of studies have shown deﬁcient long-term potentiation in
hippocampal slices from Gria1− /− mice,84–86 although more recent
studies have indicated that GluA1 subunits may contribute
primarily to short-lasting forms of synaptic plasticity.87–89
Behaviourally, Gria1− /− mice are indistinguishable from wild-
type littermates in their home cage environment. However, closer
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inspection in experimental settings reveals a speciﬁc but striking
impairment in short-term habituation in these animals. Habitua-
tion is the decline in the tendency to respond to a stimulus that
has become familiar due to prior exposure. This is likely to be an
adaptive response to ensure that attentional resources are
allocated to novel and potentially important stimuli. It has been
argued that habituation can be fractionated into short- and long-
term processes, with different underlying psychological and
neural mechanisms.45,90–92 Gria1− /− mice exhibit a pronounced
deﬁcit in short-term habituation. For example, on the novel object
recognition test, Gria1− /− mice are slower to habituate to a would-
be familiar object (Figure 1). In this task, mice are ﬁrst typically
exposed to two identical copies of an object during a sample
(‘Exposure’) phase and allowed to explore freely. When a wild-type
animal is presented with novel objects, it will begin to explore
them, but its exploratory activity gradually decreases or habituates
as the objects become familiar. In a subsequent 'Test’ phase
(usually conducted after a short delay), the mouse is exposed to a
further copy of the original object (now familiar) and a novel
object. Wild-type animals will preferentially choose to explore the
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Figure 1. Gria1− /− mice display impaired short-term habituation on the novel object recognition test. (a) The top left panel shows the design
of the standard novel object recognition task. In the Exposure phase (10-min duration), wild-type (WT) mice were exposed to two copies of an
object, and then after a 2-min interval they received a 5-min Test in which they were allowed to explore a duplicate of the familiar object and
a novel object. The levels of object exploration for Gria1− /− mice for both exposure and test phases were yoked to WT mice. The times spent
exploring the novel object during the test phase are shown as a ratio of the total time spent exploring both objects. The dashed line at 0.5
indicates chance performance. Gria1 deletion impaired memory on the standard object recognition task (right panel). Error bars indicate ± s.e.m.
(b) The middle panel shows the design of the object recency task. In the Exposure phase, WT mice received two 10-min exposures to two
different objects separated by a 2-min interval. The Test phase (5-min duration) commenced 2min after the last exposure. Mice were allowed
to explore the more recently and the less recently presented objects. The levels of object exploration for Gria1− /− mice for both exposure and
test phases were yoked to WTmice. The times spent exploring the less recently experienced object are shown as a ratio of the total time spent
exploring both objects. The dashed line at 0.5 indicates chance performance. Gria1 deletion impaired memory on the object recency test
(right panel). Error bars indicate ± s.e.m. (c) The bottom panel shows the design of the context-dependent object recognition task. In the
Exposure phase, two different objects were exposed in two different contexts. WT mice received four 10-min exposures to each object, one
per day for 4 days. On the ﬁfth day, mice were simultaneously exposed to both objects in both of the contexts in two 5-min Tests. The levels of
object exploration for Gria1− /− mice for both exposure and test phases were yoked to WT mice. The times spent exploring the object not
previously paired with the test context (that is, the unpaired object) are shown as a ratio of the total time spent exploring both objects. The
dashed line at 0.5 indicates chance performance. Gria1 deletion did not impair context-dependent object recognition task (right panel). Error
bars indicate ± s.e.m. (Data from Sanderson et al.93). *Po0.05 difference between groups.
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novel alternative, reﬂecting their stimulus-speciﬁc habituation to
the original object. In contrast, Gria1− /− mice display a deﬁcit in
short-term habituation:93 they fail to reduce the amount of
attention that is paid to recently presented stimuli. Consequently,
Gria1− /− mice show less preference than wild-type mice for a
novel object compared with a familiar object that was presented
recently93 (Figure 1a). Gria1− /− mice are also impaired on a
recency-dependent version of the object recognition task93
(Figure 1b). However, Gria1− /− mice can recognize an object as
familiar when it is consistently and repeatedly presented in a
given, distinctive context (the object-in-context paradigm;93
Figure 1c). This reﬂects the fact that they can use the context or
place to associatively retrieve or prime the memory of that object
from long-term memory, such that it feels familiar (that is, long-
term habituation is preserved). Importantly, this also shows that
their deﬁcit in short-term habituation is neither a basic perceptual
problem nor a global memory deﬁcit.
The short-term habituation deﬁcit can also be demonstrated
using a simple, spatial novelty preference task, during which
animals spontaneously explore a Perspex Y-maze surrounded by
extra-maze spatial cues (Figure 2; Sanderson et al.94,95). During the
sample or ‘Exposure’ phase, the animals are allowed to explore
two arms of the maze, while access to the third arm is blocked off.
During the subsequent choice phase, all three arms of the maze
are available to be explored. Wild-type mice avoid the recently
visited, familiar arms and choose to explore the novel arm. In
contrast, Gria1− /− mice fail to habituate to the recently visited
spatial locations and therefore show no preference between the
novel and familiar arms. This short-term spatial memory deﬁcit is
in marked contrast to the normal, or even enhanced, long-term
associative spatial reference memory that Gria1− /− mice exhibit
on tasks like the water maze or radial maze,84,94,96–98 again
demonstrating that their short-term habituation deﬁcit is not due
to perceptual impairments or a global memory deﬁcit.
Thus Gria1− /− mice are slower to habituate to both spatial and
non-spatial stimuli and, as a consequence, treat stimuli as novel
and salient for longer than wild-type mice. They are unable to
ﬁlter out, and reduce attention to, recently experienced stimuli.
This habituation deﬁcit or attentional gating failure in Gria1− /−
mice may also explain their deﬁcit in prepulse inhibition, albeit the
failure to habituate in the latter setting manifests over a different
timescale.99
GRIA1 KNOCKOUT MICE EXHIBIT SENSITIZATION
Notably, under some circumstances, salience actually increases
with repeated or continued exposure to a stimulus in Gria1− /−
mice. This is called sensitization. For example, in a recent
experiment we measured how much time mice spent looking at
different light stimuli in an operant box, depending on their recent
experience (Figure 3; Sanderson et al.47). Mice either received two
exposures to the same light separated by 30 s (for example,
ﬂashing light followed by ﬂashing light) or received a pairing
consisting of two different light stimuli (for example, ﬂashing light
followed by a constant light), again separated by 30 s. In both
wild-type and Gria1− /− mice, if the two light stimuli in the seq-
uence were different then animals spent an equal amount of time
looking at both lights. In contrast, if the two light stimuli were the
same then wild-type mice spent less time looking at the light on
its second presentation, reﬂecting short-term habituation to the
light. However, when the same light was presented twice to
Gria1− /− mice they actually spent more time attending to the light
on its second exposure (relative to the ﬁrst presentation of that
light, and relative to the presentation of a different light that had
not been presented recently). Therefore Gria1− /− mice do have a
memory of the speciﬁc light stimulus that they have just experi-
enced (their behaviour is altered by that recent prior exposure).
However, they express that memory in a very different way,
attending more to the recently presented light compared with a
more novel light. Thus for Gria1− /− mice a recently presented
stimulus can generate exaggerated (and hence aberrant) salience,
in the absence of any evidence for its motivational signiﬁcance.
Importantly, this attentional deﬁcit in Gria1− /− mice is set
against an intact ability to form associations between stimuli.
Associative learning is not impaired in these animals in a variety of
experimental settings, including both maze and operant tasks, and
in both spatial and non-spatial paradigms.84,96,97,100 Indeed, in
some situations Gria1− /− mice may actually form associations
more readily than their wild-type controls.97,101,102 This potentially
reﬂects the fact that Gria1− /− mice, by ﬁnding a given stimulus
more salient, and by paying more attention to that stimulus, are
more likely to associate other events or consequences (such as
reward) with its presence, thus facilitating long-term memory
formation.
Notably, we have also shown that Gria1− /− mice can exhibit
long-term memory under conditions where there is no evidence
of long-term memory in wild-type controls.94 Thus, in this instance
Gria1− /− mice could be said to demonstrate ‘inappropriate’
learning (where ‘inappropriate’ learning is deﬁned as learning
that isn’t exhibited by control subjects). An extension of this is the
prediction that these mice will also display abnormalities in credit
assignment (that is, the forming of inappropriate associations
between stimuli and events in a complex, temporally dynamic
environment in which there are multiple cues competing for
associative strength), leading to false inferences. This would
provide a further demonstration of the kind of aberrant learning
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Figure 2. Gria1− /− mice display impaired short-term habituation on the spatial novelty preference test. During a 5-min Exposure phase (left
panel), mice were allowed to explore two arms (Start and Other) of a 3-arm, Perspex Y-maze surrounded by distal extra-maze cues. After a 1-
min delay, the mice were returned to the maze for the Test phase (2-min duration), during which they were now able to explore freely all three
maze arms, including the previously unvisited (novel) arm (centre panel). Gria1 deletion impaired performance on the spatial novelty
preference test. Wild-type (WT) mice exhibit a preference for the previously unvisited (Novel) arm over the two familiar arms to which they
have previously been exposed (Start and Other). Gria1− /− mice did not show a signiﬁcant preference for the novel arm. Ratio of time spent in
the novel versus other arm (± s.e.m.). (Data from Sanderson et al.95). *Po0.05 difference between groups.
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that might underlie psychotic symptoms such as delusions,
and will be an important further test of our hypothesis in
Gria1− /− mice.
HABITUATION, SALIENCE AND SCHIZOPHRENIA
How relevant is this short-term habituation deﬁcit in Gria1− /−
mice to schizophrenia? In his original descriptions, Bleuler103
presciently noted that patients often experienced ‘an absence of
the feeling of familiarity’. Subsequently, it has been well
documented that patients with schizophrenia exhibit habituation
deﬁcits over a range of timescales,104 both behaviourally (for
example, in terms of habituation of the startle response105–108)
and also physiologically (for example, the reduction in evoked
responses to auditory stimuli with repeated presentations109).
Impairments in prepulse inhibition could also be considered as a
failure to reduce the attention paid to a stimulus (the startle
stimulus) based on recent prior experience (the prepulse106,108,110).
Therefore, the link between habituation deﬁcits and schizo-
phrenia has been made before. What is novel here is the link
between deﬁcits in short-term habituation that can lead to
sensitization and the notion that patients may experience
aberrant salience, with greater attention being paid to recently
presented stimuli. Indeed, it is tempting to draw parallels between
the exaggerated (aberrant) salience experienced by Gria1− /− mice
and the attentional abnormalities reported in schizophrenia,
including during the prodrome. Kapur7 noted that patients
experience a stage of heightened sensory or perceptual aware-
ness during the prodromal phase. Although accounts are usually
anecdotal and/or post-hoc, they do suggest that everything the
person experiences is intense, interesting, and highly salient. For
example, patients report feelings, such as ‘I developed a greater
awareness of…My senses were sharpened…I became fascinated
by the little insigniﬁcant things around me…Sights and sounds
possessed a keenness that he had never experienced before…It
was as if part of my brain awoke which had been dormant…My
senses seemed alive….Things seemed clearcut, I noticed things I
had never noticed before…My capacities for aesthetic apprecia-
tion and heightened sensory receptiveness were very keen at this
time. I had had the same intensity of experience at other times
when I was normal, but such periods were not sustained for
long…’ (taken from Kapur7).
In essence, people with schizophrenia appear to pay elevated
levels of attention to certain stimuli in their environment, in much
the same way that the Gria1− /− mice pay an increased amount of
attention to the recently presented light stimulus in our operant
experiment (see Figure 3; Sanderson et al.47). The fact that these
feelings of heightened awareness and intensity of perceptual
experience often emerge during the prodrome is consistent with
the possibility that these attentional deﬁcits may be a contributory
cause of psychosis and could provide the trigger for subsequent
positive symptoms.6,8,111 We suggest that sensitization in Gria1− /−
mice is homologous to the heightened intensity of sensory
stimulation experienced by patients during the prodromal phase
of the disorder.
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND NEURAL MECHANISMS UNDERLYING
SHORT-TERM HABITUATION AND THEIR ALTERATION IN
SCHIZOPHRENIA
How do deﬁcits in short-term habituation result in sensitization,
and how might these attentional phenomena be represented in
the brain? Short-term habituation reﬂects a component of short-
term memory that results in less attention being paid to a recently
experienced stimulus (the stimulus might be said to exist in a
secondary or reduced state of attention). This is distinct from an
active form of short-term memory that underlies human working
memory performance (for example, on N-back or digit span tasks)
in which the stimulus representation is actively maintained at the
forefront of attention (the primary state of attention). These
different short-term memory states therefore map onto different
attentional states, reﬂecting the different amounts of attention
being paid to a stimulus.
Wagner91 proposed a theoretical and computational model of
stimulus processing that can explain the relationship between
attention, habituation and learning (Figure 4). These ideas are of
fundamental importance for understanding how deﬁcits in short-
term habituation could lead to aberrant salience and the genesis
of psychosis. Wagner suggested that each stimulus is represented
by a set of elements. Individual elements can exist in any one of
three different activity or attentional states: an inactive state (I),
the primary state of attention (A1), or the secondary state of
attention (A2). Although proportions of elements for a given
stimulus can be in different activity states, individual elements can
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Figure 3. Gria1− /− mice display increased attention (sensitization) to a recently experienced light stimulus. Unconditioned suppression of
magazine responding to visual stimuli in an operant chamber was used as an indirect measure of the orienting response. Mice were exposed
to pairs of light stimuli. Each stimulus in the pair was presented 30 s apart (for example, ﬂashing vs constant light, depicted graphically as red
vs blue; left panel). For half of trials, the ﬁrst light in the pair was the same as the second (Same condition). For the remaining trials, the ﬁrst
light was different from the second (Different condition). Orienting to the ﬁrst light in the pair was subtracted from orienting to the second
light to give a difference score (Orienting; ms). In the Same condition, wild-type (WT) mice exhibited a reduced orienting response to the
second stimulus in the pair. In contrast, Gria1− /− mice exhibited greater responding to the second stimulus. Both groups showed similar levels
of orienting to both stimuli in the pair in the Different condition. This demonstrates that the reduction in orienting in WT mice and the
increase in orienting in Gria1− /− mice in the Same conditions are stimulus-speciﬁc (Data from Sanderson et al.47). *Po0.05 difference between
groups in the Same condition.
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only be in one state at any one time. When a stimulus is novel and
surprising, it occupies the forefront of attention, is highly salient
and generates strong levels of responding. This corresponds to
the stimulus elements being in the A1 state. Also, associations can
form between elements of different stimuli that are concurrently
active in the A1 state. Conversely, when the stimulus is treated as
familiar, less attention is paid to the stimulus, and it is less able to
enter into associations with other stimuli (that is, associative
memory formation will be weaker). This reﬂects the fact that the
stimulus elements are in the secondary attentional (A2) state.
Wagner’s model posits that there are two distinct forms of
habituation (short-term and long-term habituation), each sup-
ported by a separate psychological mechanism. For the purposes
of this review, we will concentrate on short-term habituation,
which reﬂects the recent presentation of the stimulus and which is
dependent on the GluA1 subunit. When the stimulus is ﬁrst
presented, a proportion of elements go from being inactive (I
state) and enter into the primary activity state (A1 state). Elements
then rapidly decay from this A1 state into the A2 state, where they
remain before gradually decaying back to the inactive I state. If
elements are already in the A2 state when the stimulus is
presented (for example, during the second presentation of the
same stimulus after a short interval), these elements are unable to
return directly to the A1 state. As a result, there are fewer stimulus
elements available for activation into the A1 state, and con-
sequently less responding to the stimulus (that is, there will be
habituation). Thus habitation occurs to the degree to which the
stimulus elements are in the A2 state. After sufﬁcient passage of
time, the stimulus elements decay back to the inactive state, and
so are once again fully available for subsequent activation into the
primary A1 state. Therefore habituation is now no longer evident
(that is, it is short-lasting).
As described above, Gria1− /− mice demonstrate that short-term
habituation is GluA1 dependent. In terms of Wagner’s model,
Gria1 deletion retards the normal transition of a stimulus repre-
sentation from A1 to A2 (Figure 4). Hence, in Gria1− /− mice stimuli
stay at the forefront of attention (that is, in the A1 state) and
remain salient for longer than in wild-type mice. In fact, as we
have seen, in Gria1− /− mice the stimulus can actually be treated as
increasingly salient with its repeated or continued presentation, as
the elements that comprise the stimulus gradually accumulate in
the forefront of attention and are less able to exit to the secondary
attentional state.47 This therefore provides an account of
how deﬁcits in short-term habituation can lead to sensitization
and gives us important clues as to possible underlying neural
substrates.
What are the neural mechanisms that might underlie these
changes in attention? We have suggested elsewhere that
Wagner’s elements could correspond to the neurons that underlie
the representation of the stimulus.46 When a stimulus is ﬁrst
presented and occupies the forefront of attention, a proportion of
the neurons in the brain that represent that stimulus will ﬁre and
generate action potentials (this would correspond to the primary
state of activity). Notably, only when the stimulus elements are in
this A1 state can they form excitatory associations with elements
of other stimuli, consistent with Hebb’s postulate that neurons
that ﬁre together wire together.112–114 In contrast, the secondary
state of attention, which corresponds to habituation, presumably
reﬂects the fact that the neurons that represent the stimulus are
now less excitable and less likely to ﬁre than when the stimulus
was at the forefront of attention, and they are thus also less likely
to form associations with neurons representing other stimuli. This
transition from the primary to secondary state of attention likely
reﬂects a short-term plasticity process, which depends on Gria1,
although the precise neural circuits and synaptic mechanisms
involved remain to be established (see Sandeson et al.46 for
discussion).
Evidence for reduced neuronal activity with repeated presenta-
tion of the same stimulus can be found with the phenomenon of
repetition suppression of the haemodynamic BOLD signal, which
is often observed in human fMRI experiments and in a variety of
different brain regions.72,115–120 Repetition suppression occurs
when a recently presented (and now familiar) stimulus is pre-
sented again.115 This reduction in the BOLD response likely
reﬂects the tuning or modulation of neuronal representations
such that familiar stimuli activate fewer neurons and evoke less
neuronal ﬁring. Consistent with this possibility, single cell
recordings show that repetition suppression is associated with a
decrease in neuronal ﬁring, at least in some brain regions.118,120,121
Notably, Holt et al.104 showed that repetition suppression is
impaired in schizophrenia. They showed that, in healthy indivi-
duals, medial temporal lobe activity (and in particular hippocam-
pal activity) habituates rapidly with repeated presentations of
fearful faces. In contrast, patients exhibited no suppression of
BOLD activity, consistent with a failure to habituate. Crucially,
there is also evidence suggestive of sensitization in patients. A
positron emission tomography imaging study, conducted while
subjects performed a passive viewing task,122 found repetition
suppression of cerebral blood ﬂow in the right hemisphere of
normal individuals across presentations of the same visual image
as expected, but in patients with schizophrenia the blood ﬂow
response to the visual stimulus actually increased across the
session (the equivalent of repetition enhancement in fMRI115).
Therefore patients with schizophrenia fail to reduce neuronal
activity with repeated presentations of the same stimulus,
consistent with their inability to reduce the amount of attention
A1
primary
active state
I
inactive
state
A2
secondary
active state
GluA1 deletion
Figure 4. Wagner’s model of stimulus processing. Wagner proposed
that each stimulus is represented by a number of elements. When a
stimulus is presented, a proportion of these elements go from being
inactive (I state) and enter into a primary activity or attentional state,
which might be considered as the forefront of attention or active
short-term memory (A1 state). Elements then rapidly decay from this
A1 state into a secondary activity state (A2 state) where they remain
before gradually decaying back to the inactive state (I state).
Stimulus elements can also go directly from the inactive state to the
A2 state (which involves an associative retrieval process based on
previously formed long-term memories). This is the basis of long-
term habituation and is GluA1-independent; see upper horizontal
arrow between I state and A2 state). When the elements of the
stimulus are in the A1 state, higher levels of attention are paid to the
stimulus, and it can generate strong levels of responding. Also,
associations can form between elements of different stimuli that are
concurrently active in the A1 state. In contrast, when elements are in
the secondary, attentional or A2 state, relatively less attention is paid
to the stimulus and it will generate weaker levels of responding.
GluA1 deletion retards the transition of elements from the A1 state
to the A2 state. This can potentially lead to their accumulation in the
A1 state and hence to sensitization. For further details, see text and
Sanderson et al.93,94
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that is paid to a recently presented stimulus. In some situations,
neuronal activity in patients may even increase with repeated
presentations of the same stimulus,122 potentially consistent with
sensitization to a given stimulus.
DOPAMINE AS A MEDIATING TRANSMITTER SYSTEM
We have drawn attention to the parallels between the impaired
short-term habituation seen in Gria1− /− mice and in people with
schizophrenia and suggest that these impairments may lead to
aberrant salience. We now consider how these processes are
linked and the central role that dopamine has.
Given that (i) novelty evokes activity in the striatal dopamine
system, coupled with (ii) the short-term habituation deﬁcit and
sensitization seen in Gria1− /− mice, this leads to the prediction of
enhanced dopamine activity in these mice. It is important to point
out that this hyper-dopaminergic response would likely be both
stimulus-driven and stimulus-speciﬁc and therefore not necessa-
rily reﬂected in baseline measures of the dopamine system.
Indeed, tissue levels of striatal dopamine appear normal.123
However, Gria1− /− mice do exhibit a marked locomotor hyper-
activity when placed in a novel environment, very reminiscent of
the effects of low-dose amphetamine.99,124 In both cases, animals
can exhibit levels of locomotor activity well in excess of the
activity levels displayed by controls, consistent with the possibility
of sensitization (for example, Wiedholz et al.99). Furthermore, this
hyperactivity is blocked by the dopamine D2 receptor antagonist
haloperidol.99 Using high-speed chronoamperometric measure-
ments of extracellular ﬂuid dopamine levels in anaesthetized
animals, Wiedholz et al.,99 found that the velocity of striatal
dopamine clearance was slower in Gria1− /− mice. This would be
predicted to lead to an increase in the magnitude and duration of
striatal dopamine responses. Taken together, these results are
consistent with a putative hyper-dopaminergic phenotype in
Gria1− /− mice. To test this prediction explicitly, it will be important
to assess dopamine transients in response to novel and recently
presented stimuli in freely moving, behaving mice, using
techniques like fast-scan cyclic voltammetry,77,125 to determine
what role mesolimbic and nigrostriatal dopamine pathways have
in these attentional processes (for example, Totah et al.126), and,
more speciﬁcally, whether changes in the novelty/familiarity of
stimuli are reﬂected differently in dopamine signals in wild-type
and Gria1− /− mice.
It is worth pointing out that current antipsychotic drugs appear
to dampen all salience, not just aberrant salience7,58 (that is, their
effects are not stimulus-speciﬁc), and they do not rescue deﬁcits in
habituation or its physiological correlates.104–106,109,122 Thus these
drugs may effectively silence the problem without correcting the
underlying impairment. The analogy might be with a broken radio
that is giving out white noise. Turning down the volume will
remove the immediate problem (and the distress which it causes)
but will not ﬁx the underlying malfunction. Therefore identifying
the molecular, synaptic and circuit mechanisms that support
short-term habituation may have important therapeutic implica-
tions by allowing more targeted suppression of aberrant salience.
GRIA1 AND SCHIZOPHRENIA—THE BROADER CONTEXT
To summarize, studies in Gria1− /− mice show that the GluA1
AMPAR subunit has a key role in short-term habituation. Gria1− /−
mice can pay even more attention to a recently experienced
stimulus compared with a more novel stimulus. This phenotype
may be of particular interest with regard to psychosis. First,
because stimuli are perceived more intensely and/or remain at the
forefront of attention for longer, we propose that this short-term
habituation deﬁcit can underlie aberrant salience, a process
believed to be of central importance in the origin of positive
psychotic symptoms. As a consequence, these stimuli are more
likely to enter into inappropriate or aberrant associations, leading
to the formation of delusions. Thus we suggest that changes in
stimulus processing (and the allocation of attention) caused by
GluA1 deletion are an upstream cause of deﬁcits in prediction
error learning that are seen in patients. Of course, these delusions
are often sustained for long periods of time and are impervious
to contradictory evidence. Corlett et al.54,127 have likened this
tenacity of delusions to the formation of instrumental habits seen
in learning experiments with over-training. In this respect, it is
worth noting that Gria1− /− mice also display an increased
propensity for habitual behaviour.128,129 Further experiments are
required to determine whether this is related to the deﬁcits in
short-term habituation and its possible consequences for rates of
associative learning, or whether it reﬂects a role for GluA1 in other
neural circuits supporting goal-directed behaviour. Second, as the
GRIA1 locus shows genetic association to schizophrenia, these
considerations take on possible aetiological signiﬁcance. They also
support the widely held view that dopaminergic changes in
schizophrenia are downstream of an abnormality in the glutamate
system.8,10,12,14–16,24,26,29,130
With regard to the plausibility of these suggestions, several
issues regarding the genetics and pathogenesis of schizophrenia
are relevant. First, genetic evidence for GRIA1 involvement in the
disorder is far from complete. The GWAS data show association to
a locus that is upstream of the gene, and it remains to be proven
whether risk single-nucleotide polymorphism(s) within the locus
do in fact impact on the biology of GRIA1 (and not, for example,
on another gene in the vicinity). It is not a trivial process to move
from a genetic association signal to the identiﬁcation of the
molecular consequences of the risk variation,131–133 as illustrated
by investigations of other psychosis genes.134–136 And, even
assuming that GRIA1 is the target, the effect of the risk variation
will likely be subtle, for example, by modulating transcriptional
regulation, and possibly contributing to the modest reduction of
hippocampal GluA1 expression seen in schizophrenia.35–37 In this
context, the inherent limitations of a constitutive knockout (which
models a null mutation or gene deletion) in mouse models
relevant to schizophrenia are apparent137–139 and indicate the
value of using additional genetic models of GRIA1. Indeed, it is
already clear that it may not be necessary to remove all GluA1
subunits to produce the phenotype described here, as behavioural
deﬁcits indicative of impaired short-term habituation are also seen
in mice in which Gria1 is knocked out selectively in the
parvalbumin-positive (PV+) population of interneurons.140 Further-
more, mice in which NMDARs have been ablated selectively from
PV+ cells, or mice in which PV+ cell output has been silenced,
display arguably similar phenotypes.141–144 Hippocampal PV+
interneurons may be particularly important for these behavioural
phenotypes,145 in line with a key role for this brain region in
regulating attentional processes like short-term habitua-
tion.72,146,147 Thus, parenthetically, this account is also potentially
consistent with the central role of PV+ interneurons148–150 and the
hippocampus151,152 in schizophrenia and its onset.130,153
A second important caveat when extrapolating from Gria1− /−
mice to schizophrenia is that the GRIA1 locus is but one of many
risk genes, each of which in isolation has a very small effect on
disease risk. In this respect, it is notable that the recent GWAS
study and meta-analysis also implicates other glutamatergic
genes, including GRIN2A, which encodes the NMDA receptor
GluN2A (NR2A) subunit.34 Grin2A− /− mice have a behavioural
phenotype similar to that seen in Gria1− /− mice, albeit less
extensively characterized, including a deﬁcit in short-term
habituation. For example, Grin2A− /− mice are unable to discrimi-
nate between a novel arm and recently experienced, familiar arm
during the spatial novelty preference Y-maze test.154 This is set
against an otherwise normal ability to perceive stimuli and to form
long-term associations. These Grin2A data suggest that our
proposal regarding GRIA1 and its role in short-term habituation
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and aberrant salience may generalize to at least some other
glutamatergic genes that are involved in schizophrenia, reﬂecting
their convergent effects on pathophysiological processes. As the
genomics and genetic architecture of schizophrenia become
clearer, it will be of interest to ascertain the identity and nature of
the interplay between risk genes, and thence whether there is a
functional convergence upon short-term habituation and salience.
Such convergence is plausible, given that the underlying neural
processes that support short-term habituation likely utilize
fundamental synaptic plasticity mechanisms and pathways invol-
ving numerous molecular targets.26–29,155–158
CONCLUSIONS
We have drawn attention to the impaired short-term habituation
phenotype of Gria1− /− mice and suggest that this impairment can
generate sensitization and aberrant salience, potentially via
enhanced dopaminergic signalling and defective hippocampal
circuits. Impaired habituation, aberrant salience, hyperdopaminer-
gia and the hippocampus are all central to current models of
psychosis. The recent discovery that the GRIA1 locus shows
genome-wide association to schizophrenia suggests that this
phenotypic overlap between Gria1− /− mice and the clinical syn-
drome is more than coincidence and instead reﬂects a pathway of
causal signiﬁcance linking these phenomena in schizophrenia.
Indeed, GRIA1 provides arguably the ﬁrst clear link between a
GWAS-positive ﬁnding in schizophrenia and a core psychological
process at the heart of the disorder. Clearly, this remains a
speculative notion and requires further critical evaluation using a
range of approaches. The real value of rodent models in the next
decade is surely in this domain: not as models of schizophrenia
per se but as experimental tools159 that can help link genomic
discoveries to psychological processes and elucidate the under-
lying neural mechanisms.
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